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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff and Respondent, : 
vs. : CASE NO. 870225 
LOUIS FRED IRELAND, 
Defendant and Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from a conviction in the District Court of Cache 
County involving a first degree felony, Sodomy on a Child, and 
jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code 78-2-2(h). 
Trial was to a jury on April 8 and 9, 1987, and a sentencing 
hearing was held on May 21, 1987, at which time the Defendant was 
sentenced to five years to life with a minimum mandatory of ten 
years and committed to the Department of Corrections. The 
Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal on June 15, 1987. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Court err in suggesting that the prosecuting 
attorney used leading questions in examining the alleged victim? 
2. Did the Court improperly admit hearsay in Robin Pelham's 
testimony as to prior similar events? 
3. Did the Court err in sustaining the prosecuting 
attorney's objection to testimony about statements made by his 
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ex-wife to the Defendant threatening to take custody from him? 
4. Was the evidence on the factual issues alleged in the 
information insufficient to sustain the jury verdict? 
5, Did the jury instruction on reasonable doubt unfairly 
favor the state? 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The interpretation of the following statutes and rules is 
determinative of the issue involved: 
1. Issue 1. Utah Rule of Evidence 611<c) 
Leading questions should not be used on the direct 
examination of a witness except as may be necessary to 
develop his testimony. 
2. Issue 2. Utah Rule of Evidence 802 
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or 
by these rules. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 404(a)(1)&(b) 
(a) Evidence of a person's character or a trait of 
his character is not admissible for the purpose of 
proving that he acted in conformity therewith or a 
particular occasion, except: 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a 
pertinent trait of his character offered by 
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut 
the same.... 
<b> Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is 
not admissible to prove the character of a person 
in order to show that he acted in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for 
other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
3. Issue 3. Utah Rule of Evidence 801(c) 
"Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the 
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, 
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted. 
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Utah Rule of Evidence 803 (3) 
A statement of the declarant's then existing state of 
mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such 
as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, 
and bodily health), but not including a statement or 
belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless 
it relates to the execution, revocation, 
identification, or terms of declarant's will. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 401 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence havi 
to make the existence of any fact 
consequence to the determination of 
probable or less probable than it would 
evidence. 
NATURE OF CASE 
The Defendant, Louis Ireland, was tried and found guilty by 
a jury of first degree felony of Sodomy on a Child. He was 
sentenced to a mandatory minimum of 10 years and has appealed his 
conviction. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Defendant was originally charged with Sodomy on a Child 
and Exhibiting Harmful Material to a Minor. The counts were 
severed for trial. The second count has not been tried and is 
not set for trial. The alleged victim in the charge that was 
was the Defendant's eleven year old son, (Trial Transcript, 
1. IB) (referred to hereafter by TT), who was a month shy 
on the alleged date of offense, July 27, 1986. 
The information originally charged the defendant with a 
sexual act "involving the genitals of the actor and the mouth of 
the child." After opening statements but prior to testimony the 
ng any tendency 
that is of 
the action more 
be without the 
tried 
P 47, 
of 11 
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Court permitted the State to amend by adding the language, Hor 
involving the genitals of the child and the mouth of the actor." 
(TT, p. 43, 1. 5). The prosecuting attorney amended the 
information in the following language: "or involving the genitals 
of the child and the mouth of the child." (Court Record, p.7) 
In the summer of 1986, the son, David, and his younger 
sister were living with their father in Smithfield, Utah. (TT, 
p. 48, 1. 9). The defendant and his wife had been divorced for 
several years. (TT, p. 49, 1. 9). They had had a dispute 
earlier that same summer over visitation with the children. 
(TT, p. 116, 1. 23). That confrontation had ended with the ex-
wife driving up and down the road in front of her sister-in-law's 
house hollering all kinds of foul names. (TT, p. 93, 1. 11- p. 
94, 1. 2). 
The children went to visit their mother in Idaho Falls on 
August 7 or 8. (TT, p. 49, 1. 19 and p. 117, 1. 6). At the end 
of the agreed on time, the mother didn't bring the children home. 
(TT, p. 117, 1. 15). The defendant contacted the Idaho Falls 
police and then the Cache County Sheriff on August 24 regarding 
the children. (TT, p. 117, 1. 17 - p. 118, 1. 5). At that time 
he was informed that there were sexual abuse allegations against 
him. (TT, p. 118, 1. 19). Meanwhile, the mother had brought 
David to talk to Robin Pelham of the Idaho Department of Health 
and Welfare on August 22 and a videotape was made August 27. 
(TT, p. 100, 1. 10 - p. 101, 1. 9). 
According to David, he did not tell his mother that anything 
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happened. (TT, p. 69, 1. 13). Yet his mother questioned him "if 
he'd done anything" before bringing him in to see the social 
worker. (TT, p. 70, 1. 11). He denied that his mother told him 
what to say. (TT, p. 70, 1. 6). The mother filed for change of 
custody and was awarded permanent custody October 20, 1986 (Def's 
exhibit #1), but the children were removed from their mother's 
home and placed in foster care a couple months before trial. 
(TT, p. 73, 11. 1-8). 
At trial, David responded negatively to the prosecutor's 
question, "Can you tell me what your Dad said to you?" (TT, 
p. 53, 1. 11). After the prosecutor made several gratuitous 
remarks such as "You don't like to talk about it, do you?" and 
"And I know that it's tough to try to tell about this in front of 
these people, isn't it?" (TT, p. 53, 11. 14 & 22), the Court 
interjected, "You can liberally use leading questions if you 
wish." (TT, p. 54, 1. 1). After a number of other leading 
questions, the prosecutor asked, "Did your Dad want you to take 
your pants off?" (TT, p. 55, 1. 12). 
After several more leading questions and a negative reply to 
a question as to what his dad said to threaten him, (TT, p. 59, 
11. 16-21), the Court again interjected, "You can use leading 
questions or proceed as to what happened as opposed to 
conversations." (TT, p. 59, 1. 25). With the assistance of 
dolls, the testimony was elicited that the Defendant's mouth 
touched David's penis. (TT, p. 61, 1. 17). 
On cross-examination, David admitted that at the preliminary 
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hearing he had testified this had happened in the afternoon 
rather than at night <TT, p. 68, 11. 9-18), and that he had been 
dressed in pants and shirt as opposed to just his underwear (TT, 
p. 68, 11. 19-24). He was also questioned about his 
conversations with the social worker and said he didn't remember 
telling her that his Dad did not put his mouth on David's penis 
(TT, p. 71, 1. 21) but when asked whether he had told her the 
truth when he said that a mouth did not touch a penis on that 
occasion, ne responded, "Yes. " (TT, p. 76, 11. 12-15). 
On redirect, the prosecutor tried to resolve the 
contradictions by suggesting through leading questions that there 
were two separate occurrences in Smithfield, one in the afternoon 
and one in the evening (TT, p. 77, 11. 13-19) and that the oral-
genital contact occurred on the incident in the evening. (TT, p. 
77, 1. 23). 
Further cross-examination indicated that the evening 
incident occurred two weeks before visiting his mother but he 
couldn't recall when the other incident had occurred, (TT, p. 80, 
11. 2-9) and he couldn't remember whether he had claimed that the 
incident he testified to at the preliminary hearing had also 
occurred two weeks before the visit to his mother. (TT, p. 80, 
11. 10-17). When asked whether it wasn't true that on this 
particular occasion two weeks before the visit to his mother that 
his Dad never put his mouth on David's penis and asked if he 
could remember, he responded, "No.M (TT, p. 81, 11. 6-10). When 
asked further if it was difficult that he couldn't remember, he 
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responded, "Yes." <TT, p. 81, 1. 11 & 12). On redirect, David, 
in answer to the question whether there was oral-genital contact 
on the evening occasion, first said "He did," then "He didn't," 
and then "No, n but then "In the evening he did." (TT, p. 83, 11. 
1-12). 
Robin Pelham, the social worker in Idaho who had initially 
interviewed David on August 22 with a videotaped interview on 
August 27, (TT, p. 101, 11. 2 & 9), testified that at one point 
David said there had been oral-genital contact in Utah but also 
said there hadn't . She recalled that toward the end of her 
conversation with him she asked him whether he was sure that his 
father never did anything with his mouth in Utah and David said 
he was sure. (TT, p. 101, 1. 17 - p. 102, 1. 4). She further 
indicated that while she believed David understood all her 
questions in these interviews, he told her about sexual incidents 
in Idaho and Utah, "but it was hard for him to differentiate 
between where and when and what exactly happened each time." 
(TT, p. 102, 11. 19-22, p. 104, 11. 1-6). 
Robin Pelham also testified over objection that David told 
her the abuse started when he was five and he first told someone 
when he was eight. (TT, p. 107, 11. 10-20). 
During the testimony of the Defendant, the Court sustained 
an objection to testimony about a conversation that he had had 
with his wife earlier in the summer regarding the children. (TT, 
p. 116, 11. 2-14). 
The Defendant objected to the jury instruction on reasonable 
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doubt and submitted an alternate instruction that was denied by 
the Court, <TT, p. 151, 11. 1-10). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The Court erred in suggesting that the prosecuting 
attorney use leading questions in examining the alleged victim. 
The prosecuting attorney was already using leading questions, and 
the Court's suggestions in face of the child's reluctance 
essentially permitted the prosecutor to testify to the central 
acts alleged to constitute the crime. 
II. The Court improperly admitted hearsay testimony of 
Robin Pelham regarding prior similar events. The testimony of 
prior similar acts was admitted on the grounds that it 1) 
constituted the basis of her investigation and 2) was a statement 
of the child. The hearsay testimony was irrelevant to show that 
this witness had a basis for investigation and the particular 
hearsay statements elicited from the witness did not fall under 
any recognized exception to the hearsay rule nor admissible under 
Utah Code 76-5-411. 
III. The Court erred in sustaining an objection to 
testimony of the Defendant regarding a conversation he had with 
his ex-wife earlier in the summer in which she threatened to take 
custody of the children from him. Such evidence should have been 
admissible as an exception to hearsay, showing the ex-wife's 
existing state of mind including intent, plan, and motive, 
without requiring the defendant to first affirmatively prove that 
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the ex-wife instructed her son to make a false report to the 
social worker. The state of mind of the child's mother, under 
the circumstances of this case, was relevant and the statements 
should have been admitted. 
IV. The conviction should be reversed because of the 
insufficiency of the evidence. There was no testimony to 
substantiate the material allegations of the information as 
amended, and the evidence was so insubstantial and contradictory 
with regard to the added allegations that the prosecuting 
attorney had expressed a desire to amend to, that it should be 
held to be insufficient as a matter of law. 
V. The jury instruction defining reasonable doubt was 
misleading and unfairly favored the State by placing emphasis on 
conviction rather than on acquittal, and the Defendant's proposed 
instruction, which balances both sides, should have been given. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
At two points in the direct examination of the alleged 
victim, an eleven year old boy, the Court spontaneously 
encouraged the prosecuting attorney to use leading questions. 
The prosecuting attorney had already been using leading questions 
to a significant degree, but the result of these interventions 
was to give the prosecutor free reign in use of leading questions 
to the point he was in effect testifying to the central acts 
alleged to constitute the crime. 
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After the court stated, "You can liberally use leading 
questions if you wish,w (TT, p. 54, 1. 1), the prosecutor asked, 
"Dave, did your dad want you to take your pants off." The answer 
was, "Yes." (TT, p. 55, 11. 12 & 13). After the Court 
interjected a repeated suggestion to use leading questions (TT, 
p. 59, 1. 25), the prosecutor asked the following questions: 
"And did it scare you?" (TT, p. 60, 1. 12), "Was he going to 
hurt you?" (TT, p. 60, 1. 16), "Did your dad touch your penis 
with his mouth?" (TT, p. 61, 1. 17), "Did he put his mouth over 
your penis, Dave?" (TT, p. 61, 1. 19) and, "Did you feel his 
tongue on your penis?" (TT, p. 61, 1. 23). 
Utah Rule of Evidence 611 (c) proscribes the use of leading 
questions on direct examination of a witness "except as may be 
necessary to develop his testimony." Courts have been 
traditionally lenient in permitting use of leading questions with 
children in sex abuse cases. See John Meyers, Child Witness Law 
and Practice, 1987, at page 130. However, the trial court must 
balance the legitimate need for leading questions against the 
danger of making it too easy for the child to please the 
prosecutor whom he sees as his friend or protector, or the danger 
of supplying a false memory to the witness. 
Where should the line be drawn? In the New Mexico case of 
State v. Qrona, 589 P. 2d 1041 it was held to be an abuse of 
discretion to allow the prosecutor "to lead the witness as to 
each critical element of the offense." p. 1046. In the instant 
case, the Court actively invited the prosecutor to go beyond a 
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proper and limited use of leading questions so that the 
prosecutor himself supplied the testimony on the critical 
elements of the offense. 
II. 
Certain hearsay testimony of Robin Pelham, the Idaho social 
worker who talked with the alleged victim was admitted over 
objection. After asking about other claims of abuse, the 
prosecutor asked, "How far back do these claims of abuse go, back 
to what year, do you recall?" (TT, p. 107, 1. 10). After the 
Court permitted the question, the social worker replied, "He told 
me that he first — that %it first started happening when I was 
five,' and he first told someone about it in 1983 when he was 
eight." (TT, p. 107, p. 107, 11. 8-20). Subsequent questions 
explored her "investigation" of the prior alleged abuse with 
which she had had no involvement. 
The admissibility of this information can be sustained only 
if it is not hearsay, that is, not offered for the truth of the 
matter asserted, or comes within a recognized exception to 
hearsay. In a case involving a similar o£f&ns&, a statement of a 
child to his mother was offered as non-hearsay to explain her 
bringing the child to the hospital. State v. Rivers, 678 P. 2d 
1373 (Orig. 1984). In holding the admission improper, the Court 
stated, "The reason the mother took her daughter to the hospital 
is not relevant to the legal issue of the molestation charge. " 
p. 1378. Likewise, in this case, statements of prior incidents 
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of sexual abuse were irrelevant as a basis for her interviewing 
the child. She would have done that anyway in connection with 
the incident charged in this case. 
Nor are the statements admissible under any exception to the 
hearsay rule, the most applicable which would be Utah Code 76-5-
411. No findings were made by the Court as required and a 
reasonable reading would require that the statement of the child 
pertain specifically to the incident charged. 
It appears that the statements were designed to go primarily 
to the defendatns character to show that he acted in conformity 
therewith, but such is not admissible under Rule of Evidence 
404(a)(1)&(b>. 
III. 
The Court should have permitted the Defendant to testify to 
a conversation he had with his ex-wife a short time earlier that 
summer when she threatened to get custody of the children from 
him. When inquiring as to the dispute that they had in the 
summer of 1986, the prosecuting attorney objected on the basis of 
hearsay. (TT. p. 114, 1. 21). The Court sustained the objection 
indicating we would have to chow that statements were made to the 
child to provide a motive for what he would say or testify to. 
(TT, p. 115, 11. 1-5, 14-16, p. 116, 11. 14 & 16). 
Such testimony should have been permitted under Rule 803 (c) 
which permits introduction of hearsay statements to show the 
declarant's then existing stale of mind as it relates to intent, 
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plan, or motive. The rule does not limit the declarant to the 
alleged victim and given the close proximity of the argument to 
the time a report was made of the alleged incident of abuse while 
the child was with the mother in Idaho, it would seem to fit the 
definition of "relevant evidence" in Rule 401, "evidence having 
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence." While the 
connection to the child is circumstantial, the motive or intent 
of the ex-wife would appear to be relevant. 
IV. 
The evidence as to the factual issues alleged in the 
information was insufficient to sustain the jury's verdict of 
guilty. 
The material allegation of the information originally read, 
"engaged in a sexual act upon a child under the age of 14 
involving the genitals of the actor and the mouth of the child. " 
The prosecutor, after opening argument but prior to testimony 
moved to amend to include the alternative "or involving the 
genitals of the child and the mouth of the actor" apparently 
because of uncertainty as to what the child would testify. The 
prosecutor, however, amended the information to read, "or 
involving the genitals of the child and the mouth of the child." 
(Court Record, p. 7). There was no evidence presented to 
substantiate either of the alternatives in the information. 
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In criminal cases, the pleadings, consisting of the 
information, bill of particulars furnished defendant, and his 
plea, form the issues and limit the accusation to matters therein 
alleged and denied. State v. Anderson, 116 P. 2d 398 at 401. In 
the case of State v. Taylor, 378 P.2d 352 (Utah, 1963), the Court 
cited with approval the cases of State v. Meyers, 302 P. 2d 276 
and State v. Pettit, 93 P.2d 675 for the proposition that 
variances of form (immaterial) could be overlooked in contrast to 
variances of substance (material) which would prove fatal. State 
v. Meyers, involved a bill of particulars where the evidence 
adduced at trial from the testimony of one of two alleged victims 
showed substantially more loss to that particular victim than 
indicated in the bill. State v. Pettit involved a charge of 
forgery where a facsimile of a check different than the one 
actually charged was made a part of the information. "The code 
of criminal procedure is not designed to eliminate essential 
averments or to permit the pleading of misleadinn factual data, 
whether or not it is done knowingly." Pettit a 676. The fact 
that it was done by mistake in the instant case does not in any 
sense lessen the requirement of proving the material elements of 
the offense as alleged. Both Meyers and Pettit were remanded for 
new trials. 
Even if these material variances are for some reason held to 
not be fatal, there was so much confusion in the testimony of the 
alleged victim, there was so much improper leading by the 
prosecuting attorney, and his allegation of the oral-genital 
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contact occurring in Utah so contradicted by the social worker's 
testimony as to her video-taped interview of him shortly after 
the incident that this Court should hold that there was 
insufficient evidence as a matter of law on the issue of whether 
or not there was substantial evidence on the material elements as 
they were meant to be amended, and in particular, whether such 
incident occurred in the state of Utah. At the end of her video-
taped interview with him shortly after the incident was alleged 
to have happened, he told her he was sure that his father never 
did anything with his mouth in Utah. (TT, p. 101, 1. 23 - p. 
102, 1. 4). 
V. 
The jury instruction on the definition of reasonable doubt 
unfairly favored the State by placing emphasis on conviction 
rather than acquittal. The given instruction was believed to be 
number 6 but appears as number 7. (Court Record, p. 72). The 
whole emphasis of the instruction is on what doesn't constitute 
reasonable doubt. "It is not mere possible doubt...", "...there 
is not a reasonable doubt", "...Doubt to be reasonable must be 
actual and substantial...." The instruction offered by the 
defendant (Court Record p. 65) is much more balanced and lets the 
jury know that if, after an impartial consideration and 
comparison of all the evidence they can honestly say they aren't 
satisfied of the defendant's guilt, they have a reasonable doubt. 
The instruction as given placed emphasis on conviction rather 
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than on acquittal, and thus because of undue emphasis tended to 
be misleading to the jury. An instruction likely to mislead the 
jury should not be given. State v. Hughes, 469 P.2d 503. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant requests in the alternative, that this Court 
remand the case with instructions to dismiss or for new trial, or 
for imposition of sentence on the lesser included offense of 
sexual abuse of a child 
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